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Till Cant cease, nothing else can begin. 
-Thomas Carlyle 
ON OCTOBER 4. 1957, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HUMAN HISTORY, man succeeded in sending an object into outer space. The world was electri, 
fled. There was an overwhelming yearning that the whole of outer space, in, 
eluding all the celestial bodies, should be reserved for exploration and use for 
peaceful purposes only-in other words, completely demilitarised as Antarctica 
was being demilitarised in 1959 in the Antarctic Treaty'! Almost immediately, 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, in Resolution 1148 (XII), 
adopted on the 14th of the following month,2 urged all the States concerned, 
particularly those in the Sub,Committee of the Disarmament Commission that 
were negotiating an agreement on reduction, limitation and open inspection of 
armament and armed forces, to give priority to reach a disarmament agreement 
which, upon its entry into force, will provide for the following: 
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(f) the joint study of an inspection system designed to ensure that the 
sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and 
scientific purposes; 
A year later, on December 13,1958, the General Assembly, in another reso, 
lution,3 reiterated "the common interest of mankind in outer space and ... that 
it is the common aim that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes 
only." However, it was clear at the same time that the prime motive and incen, 
tive of the "space" Powers in reaching outer space were obviously military. 
The diplomats of the Soviet Union and of the United States, at the time the 
only countries with space capability, consequently were faced with the seem, 
ingly impossible task of how not to appear to defy an almost universal desire for 
the exclusively peaceful uses of outer space, while preserving their countries' 
need to explore and exploit all the military potentials of outer space. For the 
Soviet Union, with its closed society and authoritarian regime, it was relatively 
simple. It had only to lie about its military activities, by either denying their ex, 
istence or labelling them as scientific (as it in fact did, for example, for a consid, 
erable time with its own reconnaissance satellites), while denouncing the U.S. 
ones as unlawful. For the United States, there obviously would be practical dif, 
ficulties in following such a course. However, its diplomats, assisted, no doubt 
ably, by highly effective lawyers, also succeeded in minimal time in squaring the 
circle by simply re,inventing the word "peaceful" and changing its meaning 
from "non,military," to "non,aggressive."4 
It thus became possible to create a highly misleading impression that all were 
agreed that the whole of outer space was to be used exclusively for peaceful 
purposes, while the space Powers carried on with their military ambitions in 
outer space. This impression was somehow carried over into the 1967 Space 
Treaty,5 the first and the most important treaty relating to outer space con' 
cluded under the auspices of the United Nations, and one intended to establish 
the international legal framework for man's exploration and use of outer 
space.6 Since, by its nature and because of the wide acceptance of most, if not 
necessarily all, of the provisions of the Space Treaty as rules of general interna, 
tionallaw by contracting and non,contracting parties to the Treaty alike, the 
myth has also grown up that outer space, in~luding the moon and other celes, 
tial bodies, has been reserved for exploration and use for exclusively peaceful 
purposes only, not only under the Space Treaty but also under general interna, 
tionallaw. The present paper is a re,examination of the 1967 Space Treaty, 
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and in particular its Article IV, in order to clarify their impact on the military 
use of outer space. 
Clarification of the Terms "Outer Space" and "Outer Void Space" 
First of all, it may be necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "outer 
space" and to introduce the term "outer void space." Up to and including the 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo~ 
ration and Use of Outer Space in General Assembly Resolution 1962, adopted 
on December 13, 1963,7 the United Nations, including its Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), where international space law was 
constantly being discussed with a view to its progressive development, always 
referred to outer space separately from celestial bodies. For instance, Article 3 
of the Declaration provides: 
"Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation .... " 
(emphasis added). 
According to this terminology, extraterrestrial space consists, therefore, of 
"outer space" and "celestial bodies." Celestial bodies are thus treated as a cate~ 
gory apart from outer space as such, as illustrated in figure 1. However, since 
the 1967 Space Treaty, which in other respects follows the 1963 Declaration 
closely in form and in substance, the United Nations always speaks of "outer 
Figure 1: Meaning of "Outer Space" Up to the 1963 Resolution 
OUlER~~AC~ + 
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space, including the moon and other celestial bodies" in treaties and other in, 
struments relating to outer space which it has sponsored. Thus, the 1967 Space 
Treaty, in its Article II, which is equivalent to the above,quoted Article 3 of 
the 1963 Declaration, provides: 
"Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to 
national appropriation .... " (emphasis added). 
In other words, henceforth the moon and other celestial bodies were no longer 
treated as being separate from outer space as such, but rather as forming part of 
it, as shown in figure 2. It follows that whenever reference is made to "outer 
Figure 2: Meaning of "Outer Space" since the 1967 Space Treaty, 
Which, by Including Celestial Bodies Within It, Deprives the Space Outside 
Celestial Bodies, Previously Known as Outer Space, of a Name of Its Own 
'iiUIlrn~~ 




space," the moon and all the other celestial bodies are automatically included. 
One of the consequences of this change in the use of the term outer space is 
that the vast space in between all the celestial bodies has lost any specific desig, 
nation. It has become nameless, causing a great deal of confusion and misun, 
derstanding. What I have done is to name it the "outer void space,"8 as can be 
seen in figure 3, hoping thereby to clarify the nomenclature of the different 
parts of outer space before we embark on the meaning of the word "peaceful." 
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Figure 3: Need to Introduce the Term "Outer Void Space" 
DurER VOID SPACE 
OUTER 
¢::lSPACE 
The Meaning of "Peaceful": A Legal Trompe,VOeil 
In 1604, Sir Henry Wotton, one of King James 1's ambassadors, while on his 
way from England to Venice to take up his post, wrote in the album of his friend 
Christopher Fleckamore at Augsburg: 
"Legatus est vir bonus peregre missus ad mentiendum reipublicae causa." 
Translated into English, it means: 
"An ambassador is an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." 
One sometimes wonders whether, especially since power politics in disguise 
took over from open power politics after World War II,9 some international 
lawyers, spurred on perhaps at one time by the Cold War, when advising or as, 
sisting their diplomatic colleagues in international discussions or negotiations, or 
even in their own approach to the subject, have not consciously or uncon, 
sciously allowed their calling to be abused in order to help create an illusion; 
presumably for our benefit, that we are now all living in some brave and cozy 
New World Order, free from all the restraints of the past. 
Nowhere is this more clearly shown than the attempt to transfigure "peace, 
ful" from meaning "non,military" to meaning "non,aggressive," which appears 
to have started with international space law. 10 We need to go back no further 
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than the fifties to find the original meaning of the word, when Atoms for Peace 
was then the world's most fashionable preoccupation. International agree~ 
ments for assistance and co~operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
proliferated. I I Peace then definitely meant non~military. Imagine someone, at 
that time or even now, trying to justify the diversion of nuclear fuel and tech~ 
nology supplied under such agreements to making what one would like to de~ 
scribe as a peaceful and non~aggressive nuclear bomb to be used only when 
threatened! Even in 1959, the Antarctic Treaty in its Article I made it crystal 
clear that "peaceful" meant "non~military."12 
Yet, only three years and two days after the signing of the Antarctic Treaty 
on December 1, 1959, which was, after all, done in Washington, Senator Al~ 
bert Gore, Sr., representing the United States, stated on December 3, 1962, be~ 
fore the First Committee of the United Nations in New York that: 
It is the view of the United States that outer space should be used only for 
peaceful-that is, non~aggressive and beneficial-purposes. The question of 
military activities in space cannot be divorced from the question of military 
activities on earth. To banish these activities in both environments we must 
continue our efforts for general and complete disarmament with adequate 
safeguards. Until this is achieved, the test of any space activities must not be 
whether it is military or non,military, but whether or not it is consistent with the 
United Nations Charter and other obligations oflaw.13 
It is clear that the United States was at this point trying hard to attribute an 
entirely new meaning to the word "peaceful." This piece of semantic and legal 
acrobatics was obviously a bold attempt to bypass and circumvent the then still 
prevalent attitude that all military activities should be banned from outer 
space, while seemingly accepting it, thus reaping the benefit, as the saying goes, 
of having the cake and eating it too. Apart from the two General Assembly res, 
olutions quoted at the beginning of this chapter, another example of this com~ 
mon attitude at the time was a statement by the Indian delegate to COPUOS 
earlier the same year, when he declaimed: 
My delegation cannot contemplate any prospect other than that outer space 
should be a kind of warless world, where all military concepts of this earth should 
be totally inapplicable .... There should be only one governing concept, that of 
humanity and the sovereignty of mankind. I4 
However, this highly emotive, understandable and popular desire was unre, 
alistic for at least two reasons. First, the motive and incentive of the space 
86 
Bin Cheng 
Powers in pouring astronomical amounts of money into the space programmes 
were first and foremost military, and from that point of view their expectations 
were amply vindicated in no time. IS Thus, although the launching of Sputnik I in 
1957 was part of the scientific International Geophysical Year programme, 16 
there is little doubt as to the effect Sputnik I was perceived to have on the world's 
balance of military power. Whilst, until Sputnik I, the Soviet delegate sat alone 
with delegates of four Western Powers in the five,Power Disarmament Sub, 
Committee of the Conference of Foreign Ministers, two years after Sputnik I it 
was decided to replace this Sub,Committee with a ten,Power Disarmament 
Committee consisting of five NATO States and five Warsaw Pact States-in 
other words, parity instead of being outnumbered one to fourl I7 After all, if a 
State can put several tons of hardware into earth orbit, it is demonstrably capable 
of sending missiles with nuclear warheads practically anywhere in the world, with, 
out the need of foreign military bases or an extensive navy. To expect the space 
Powers or near,space Powers, after acquiring or about to acquire space capability, 
to abandon the use of outer space for military purposes was wholly unrealistic. 
Secondly, as Senator Gore quite rightly pointed out, disarmament in outer 
space cannot take place in isolation from the problem of disarmament on earth. 
The Soviet Union took the same line, and for a long time declined to discuss the 
control of the military use of outer space in COPUOS, maintaining that it fell within 
the jurisdiction of the Disarmament Commission. IS Thus in the negotiations of the 
1967 Space Treaty, attempts by some delegations to bring about a complete de' 
militarisation of outer space were clearly rejected by both superpowers. I9 
The problem for the superpowers was how, from the standpoint of public 
relations, not merely to not appear to flatly reject the emotive demand that 
was sweeping the world for an outer space devoted exclusively to peaceful uses, 
but also to appear as if to endorse it, while, from the legal point of view, fully 
maintaining their rights to use outer space for military purposes. As mentioned 
before, the two superpowers each developed their own way of accomplishing 
the seemingly impossible. For the Soviet Union, with its closed society, totali, 
tarian regime, and strict control over the media, the solution was relatively sim, 
ple.2o It had in fact jumped on the peace bandwagon. It even submitted a 
proposal in the United Nations to prohibit the use of outer space for military 
purposes.2l All it had to do, as it was wont to, was pretend that all its military 
space missions were for scientific, and therefore solely peaceful, purposes, while 
of course resisting all suggestions of verification. Thus, in the beginning, it pre' 
tended that it did not use satellites for military reconnaissance and maintained 
that it was illegal to "spy" from outer space, while of course it was doing so all 
the time.22 For the United States, while one cannot rule out that it might have 
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resorted to such methods on occasions, to sustain such a course on a long~term 
basis would have been difficult. Here is where its diplomats, advised no doubt 
by their ingenious legal colleagues, started, as we have seen, to re~invent the 
word "peaceful," turning its meaning from "non~military" to "non~aggressive" 
so that all its military space missions, not being aggressive, would also be for 
peaceful purposes. In so doing, an illusion was created by both space Powers 
that outer space has in fact been kept exclusively for peaceful uses. Mission im~ 
possible was accomplished. 
Our task here is primarily to re~examine the effects of the 1967 Space 
Treaty,23 in particular Article N, on the military use of outer space as well as the 
impact, if any, which this masterpiece oflegal trompe~l'oeil has had on the Treaty. 24 
Background to Article IV of the 1967 Space Treaty 
The 1967 Treaty represents a compromise reached by the then two super~ 
powers during a thaw in their relations after Nikita Khrushchev came to power 
in the Soviet Union, and especially following the inauguration of John Ken~ 
nedy as President of the United States;25 the thaw continued during the presi~ 
dency of Lyndon Johnson. The first real breakthrough on the disarmament 
front was the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty on August 5, 1963.26 It will 
be recalled that the contracting States "undertake to prohibit, to prevent, and 
not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explo~ 
sion ... in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space."27 The Treaty 
was not only the first multilateral agreement with a specific reference to outer 
space, it also related to disarmament. This move was accompanied by an~ 
nouncements from both the U.S. and the USSR the same year that they would 
not station any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass de~ 
struction in outer space. These superpower expressions of intentions were wel~ 
corned by the UN General Assembly, which adopted Resolution 1884 (XVIII) 
on October 17, 1963, calling on all States: 
to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such 
weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any 
other manner. ' 
Article IV(1) of the 1967 Space Treaty adopted the wording from Resolu~ 
tion 1884 almost verbatim. In other words, by then, agreements had already 
been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on the sub-
ject.28 Article IV(1) provides: 
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States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in 
outer space in any other manner. 
Before proceeding further to examine the meaning and effect of Article IV, let 
us examine those of the remaining provisions in the 1967 Space Treaty which 
might have an effect on the military use of outer space. 
Provisions Other Than Article IV 
The Preamble. If we consider the 1967 Treaty carefully, and exclude Article 
IV, we find that only the Preamble contains references to both peaceful pur, 
poses and weapons. The Preamble has often been cited as evidence that outer 
space can only be used for "peaceful purposes." However, if we look at the Pre, 
amble with care, we find this view difficult to sustain. 
The Preamble begins with the opening paragraph: "The States Parties to this 
Treaty," and ends with the paragraph: "Have agreed on the following." The reI, 
evant passages in the Preamble relating to peaceful use are the third, fifth, and 
eighth paragraphs. They are respectively as follows: 
Recognising the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific as 
well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful 
purposes, 
Recalling Resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from placing in 
orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of 
weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celestial bodies, 
which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 
October 1963, 
... .29 
A close look at paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Preamble will show that the con' 
tracting Parties "recognise" that mankind is interested in the "progress of the 
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes," and "desire" to con, 
tribute to broad international co-operation in such exploration and use. Para, 
graph 8 merely recalls a resolution of the General Assembly, which in itself has 
no legally binding force. All that paragraph 8 does is to remind one that the 
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obligation undertaken in Article IV(l) of the Treaty has already been the sub-
ject of a General Assembly resolution exhorting all States to do likewise. 
In law, it is well established that preambles to treaties do not normally con-
tain provisions with binding obligations. They may at best serve as an aid in in-
terpreting the substantive provisions of the Treaty. As the last paragraph of this 
Preamble notes, what the contracting States have "agreed on" is to be found 
only in the "following" articles. 
In sum, contrary to a fairly prevalent misconception, there is nothing in the 
Preamble which says or even suggests that outer space can only be used for 
peacefUl purposes. 
:Article I(1). The same can be said of Article 1(1) of the Treaty, which provides: 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial 
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific developments, and shall be 
the province of all mankind. 
Although framed in apparently obligatory language with the imperative 
"shall," the article is extremely general and unspecific, so much so that during 
the negotiations some delegates actually suggested that it should be transferred 
to the Preamble.3° After all, what constitutes the benefit and interests of all 
countries is highly subjective. This provision, as a legally binding command, 
can easily lead to various kinds oflegal sophism. Thus at the height of the Cold 
War in the fifties, the United States, under the first incarnation of its Open 
Skies policy31 (a term which currently is used to mean various other things), 
justified its U-2 programme of overflying other countries as legitimate surveil-
lance in defence of the free world.32 Atmospheric nuclear tests at the time in 
the Pacific were also justified on the same basis. No doubt the Soviet Union 
would consider the defence and advance of Socialism or Communism as good 
for the soul of the world. So, of course, did the Inquisition about the work of the 
Inquisitor-General! Article 1(1) as such can, therefore, hardly justify the view 
that it obliges the contracting Parties to the Space Treaty to use outer space 
solely for peaceful purposes, or solely for non-military purposes.33 Moreover, 
the Declaration on International Co-operation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Par-
ticular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on December 13, 1996, in Resolution 51/122, 
has now made it quite clear that the exploration and use of outer space for pur-
poses such as those enumerated in Article I of the Space Treaty are matters of 
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free and voluntary co' operation between States "on an equitable and mutually 
acceptable basis." The pursuit of those purposes is, therefore, not a condition 
governing the contracting States' space activities. 
Articles IX and XI. Articles IX and XI are the only articles, other than Article 
IV, where the word peaceful is found. They are worded as follows: 
Article IX: In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the 
principles of co,operation and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their 
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due 
regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. 
States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid 
their harmful contamination and adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where 
necessary, shall adopt appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to 
the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its 
nationals in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would 
cause potential harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the 
peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies, it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty 
which has reason to believe that an activity or experiment planned by another 
State Party in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would 
cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may 
request consultation concerning the activity or experiment. 
Article XI: In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting 
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to 
inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and 
international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and 
practicable, of the nature, conduct, location and results of such activities. On 
receiving the said information, the Secretary, General of the United Nations 
should be prepared to disseminate it immediately and effectively. 
Both provisions make it abundantly clear that they are merely promoting in, 
ternational co,operation in the "peaceful exploration and use of outer space." 
Like the Preamble and Article I, they carry no suggestion that outer space can 
be used only for peaceful or non' military purposes. The reference to "peaceful" 
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in Article IX is clearly intended to limit the benefit of consultation in case of 
potential interference with space activities to solely "the peaceful exploration 
and use of outer space." Similarly, Article XI intends merely to promote 
"co,operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space." Further, 
more, in so doing, Article XI obviously is using the term "peaceful" to mean 
"non,military" and not "non,aggressive." Otherwise, the contracting Parties 
would carry a duty, however attenuated by the escape phrase "to the greatest ex, 
tent feasible and practicable," "to inform the Secretary,General of the United 
Nations as well as the public and the international scientific community ... of 
the nature, conduct, locations and results" of even their military space activi, 
ties, in order to promote international co,operation in the "non,aggressive," in' 
cluding military, exploration and use of outer space. One can hardly ascribe to 
the extremely sophisticated negotiators such a degree of naivety! And why only 
"the public and the international scientific community"? If such co,operation 
were to include "non,aggressive" military exploration and use, surely govern, 
ment departments and the military community would be acutely interested and 
deserve to be expressly included. 
In short, neither in the Preamble, nor in any provisions of the Space Treaty 
other than Article N, do we find any restriction of outer space to exploration 
or use exclusively for peaceful purposes, or limiting the military use of outer 
space. While there is a desire to promote peaceful exploration and use, even 
the most extreme form of teleological interpretation cannot ferret out any 
shared resolve in these provisions to impose any restriction on the contracting 
States to use outer space solely for peaceful purposes, and not to use it for mili, 
tary purposes. Weare consequently left with only Article IV in the whole 
Treaty which deals with the military use of outer space. Furthermore, to the ex, 
tent to which the word "peaceful" is used in any of the text we have so far ex, 
amined, the word "peaceful" is used to mean, and is clearly intended to mean, 
"non,military" and not "non, aggressive." 
The Eisenhower Proposal 1960 
Article IV of the Space Treaty can be traced back to a proposal made by 
President Dwight Eisenhower before the General Assembly of the United Na, 
tions on September 22, 1960. Afterrecalling the recent example of the Antarc, 
tic Treaty and the missed opportunity of 1946 when the Soviet Union turned 
down the United States' Atoms for Peace Plan for placing atomic energy under 
international control, he proposed: 
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1. \Y/ e agree that celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation by any 
claims of sovereignty. 
2. \Y/ e agree that the nations of the world shall not engage in warlike activities 
on these bodies. 
3. \Y/e agree, subject to appropriate verification, that no nation will put into 
orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction. All launchings of 
space craft should be verified in advance by the United Nations. 
4. \Y/e press forward with a programme of international co-operation for 
constructive peaceful uses of outer space under the United Nations ... ,34 
Although the Paris Summit meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev 
planned for late May 1960 collapsed owing to the U-2 incident on the first of 
that month,35 it is apparent how closely the 1967 Space Treaty was patterned 
on the Eisenhower proposal. The exception is, of course, on advance monitor-
ing of all launchings of spacecraft. This was obviously due to Soviet opposition. 
All that the United Nations_was at first able to do on this score was to adopt 
General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI) the following year on December 20, 
1961, calling upon States launching objects into orbit or beyond to inform 
promptly the United Nations of such launchings, and asking the Secre-
tary-General to establish a public register to record them. But such reporting 
was voluntary and the register very incomplete,36 It was not until the conclu-
sion of the 1975 Registration Convention37 that a "mandatory"-to use the 
word in its Preamble-system of registering of objects launched into space was 
established by the contracting States. However, owing to Soviet opposition, 
the system is far from watertight. The Soviet Union persistently objected to 
having to make available advance information about launching. Thus, under 
the Convention, the duty to register a space object on the national register 
arises in reality only when an object has been launched (Article II), and noth-
ing is said as to how soon after launching the registration should take place. 
Moreover, the duty is to notify the United Nations of such launchings "as soon 
as practicable" (Article IV), which can mean, and in some cases does mean, at 
no time. Finally, the Registration Convention, in addition to some general de-
tails and the basic orbital parameters to be provided to the United Nations, 
only requires the launching State to indicate the "general function of the space 
object" (Article IV). It is believed that many of the Soviet satellites described 
as scientific in notifications to the United Nations were in fact military,38 
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The objective of verifying all launchings has obviously not been achieved. 
A rather similar idea was that proposed by France in 1978. This was for an in~ 
ternational satellite monitoring agency (ISMA) to verify arms control treaties, 
as well as to monitor crisis areas.39 Even more ambiguous proposals were subse~ 
quently made by, among others, Italy,40 Australia and Canada,41 and in due 
course, in a complete volte~face, probably not uninfluenced by the United 
States Strategic Defense Initiative, by the Soviet Union itself, which in 1988 
put forward the idea of a international body of inspectors to carry out on~site 
inspections to ensure that no object carrying weapons would be launched into 
space.42 However, such ideas appear to be some distance away from fruition,43 
although, as things turn out, remote sensing satellites have become one of the most 
useful tools in the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.44 
But, returning to the Space Treaty, it can be seen that, for the rest, the basic 
ideas of the 1960 Eisenhower proposal have been largely agreed to by the Soviet 
Union and the other States and translated into binding obligations in the 1967 
Space Treaty. Although, following item 1 of the Eisenhower proposal, the initial 
United States draft of a treaty put forward by the Johnson administration was lim~ 
ited to celestial bodi~s,45 the United States was quick to agree with the overwhelm~ 
ing desire in COPUOS, including that of the Soviet Union, to enlarge the scope of 
the Treaty to the whole of outer space.46 Item 1 thus finds expression in Article II 
of the Space Treaty. Article N of the Treaty is clearly inspired by items 2 and 3. 
As regards item 4, this is, of course, what the rest of the Space Treaty is all 
about: a programme of international co~operation for "constructive peaceful 
uses of outer space under the United Nations." Thus the phrase "international 
co~operation" or "co~operation" is expressly referred to in at least five of the 
thirteen substantive articles of the Treaty, including, as mentioned before, Ar~ 
ticles I, IX and XI, whilst several of the remaining articles are concerned with 
mutual assistance in the event of accident, distress or emergency, such as Arti~ 
cles V and VIII.47 In order further to drive home the point that "peaceful" can 
only mean "non~military" and not "non~aggressive" in the context of outer 
space, one merely has to reflect whether President Eisenhower, especially as he 
was harking back to the Antarctic Treaty and the Atoms for Peace Plan, could 
really and realistically have suggested that States should establish a programme 
under the United Nations for international co~operation in the non~aggressive 
uses of outer space, including military uses. At th!;! same time, it may also be 
useful to recall that up to this point, we have come across no hint from the su~ 
perpowers or the actual drafts to the Treaty that the whole of outer space 
should be reserved in law exclusively for peaceful purposes. The only provision 
on use exclusively for peaceful purposes is in Article IV(2), and this applies 
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solely to the moon and other celestial bodies, and definitely not to the space in 
between the celestial bodies, which we call the outer void space. 
Article IV(2) 
The Meaning of Peaceful in Sentence One. Insofar as Article IV(2) is con~ 
cemed, there is little doubt that the word "peaceful" means "non~military" and 
not "non~aggressive." Article IV(2) provides: 
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the 
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, 
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the 
conduct of military manceuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of 
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall 
not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful 
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited. 
1. Textual and Semantic Prestidigitation. A comparison of Article IV(2) with 
item 2 of the Eisenhower proposal may provide an additional clue as to the rea~ 
son behind the switch in the meaning of the word "peaceful." It will be seen 
that the Eisenhower proposal, which was presumably the fruit of some inter~ 
agency consultation in the Administration, intended merely to ban "warlike 
activities on these bodies," i.e., hostile or aggressive activities, but not necessar~ 
ily all military activities. At that initial stage of space exploration, it is not in~ 
conceivable that one might perhaps have thought of a military telecom~ 
munications centre on the moon, or using it for the training of troops for space 
combat, or some other non~aggressive military activities. In the sixties, it was 
probably premature to rule out such possibilities and in the negotiations of the 
Space Treaty that could well have been the brief of the United States negotia~ 
tors. It should further be remembered that at first the United States had pro~ 
posed a treaty limited to celestial bodies. It was only after the negotiations had 
started that it agreed to extend the scope of the treaty to include also the outer 
void space. As to outer void space, there was no question of accepting complete 
demilitarisation. 
They were then faced with a problem. There was the precedent set by Arti~ 
cle I of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty which had been mentioned by President Ei~ 
senhower himself when introducing the United States 'proposal before the 
General Assembly, and which was fresh in everyone's mind. The negotiators 
might well have thought that to apply the Antarctic precedent 100 percent to 
all celestial bodies, including the moon, which would preclude any military 
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activities thereon, would already exceed their brief, but to also apply it to the 
outer void space would be completely out of the question. However, as men~ 
tioned earlier, there was immense clamour from all quarters for outer space as a 
whole to be reserved exclusively for peaceful use. To reject this demand out~ 
right would hardly have been politic. 
This would explain why the United States negotiators decided to carry their 
newly invented semantic prestidigitation48 into the Space Treaty, and at the 
same time to omit the clear and unambiguous introductory words in the second 
sentence of Article I of the Antarctic Treaty.49 In so doing, they probably 
thought they had achieved the seemingly impossible. According to their own 
interpretation, while nominally acceding, if not totally, at least partially, to the 
popular demand for an outer space reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, 
they would have banned only warlike (i.e., aggressive) activities on the moon 
and other celestial bodies in accordance with the original brief, but kept them 
completely free for non~warlike (i.e., not aggressive) military activities, save for 
a few specific prohibitions enumerated in the second sentence of Article IV (2). 
However, it is not believed that they have succeeded in doing so. 
2. The Antarctic Analogy and the Plain Meaning of the Word "Peaceful." In the 
first place, it may be of interest to compare the wording of Article I of the Ant~ 
arctic Treaty with Article IV(2) of the Space Treaty: 
1959 Antarctic Treaty 
ARTICLE!. 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful 
purposes only. There shall be prohibited, 
inter alia, any measures of a military na~ 
ture, such as the establishment of military 
bases and fortifications, the carrying out 
of military manceuvres, as well as the test~ 
ing of any type of weapons. 
2. The present Treaty shall not pre~ 
vent the use of military personnel or 
equipment for scientific research or for 
any other peaceful purposes. 
1967 Space Treaty 
ARTICLE IV (2). The moon and other 
celestial bodies shall be used by all States 
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peace~ 
ful purposes. The establishment of military 
bases, installations and fortifications, the 
testing of any type of weapons and the 
conduct of military manceuvres on celes~ 
tial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of 
military personnel for scientific research 
or for any other peaceful purposes shall not 
be prohibited. The use of any equipment or 
facility necessary for peaceful exploration of 
the moon and other celestial bodies shall 
also not be prohibite~l" 
That the word "peaceful" in Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty means 
"non~military" is clear. A comparison of the wording of Article IV (2) of the 
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Space Treaty with that of Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty shows that it is the 
obvious intent of Article IV(2) of the Space Treaty to lay down basically the 
same kind of obligation in regard to celestial bodies as Article I of the Antarctic 
Treaty in respect of Antarctica, with the same kind of provisos, and with 
"peaceful" meaning definitely "non~military". The few departures here and 
there in the actual wording in no way detract from it. It is hoped that this paper 
will succeed in demonstrating that nothing in Article IV (2) or anywhere else in 
the Space Treaty even faintly suggests that "peaceful" means anything else, 
least of all "non~aggressive." Only the reverse is true. It is submitted that no 
amount of efforts on the part of the United States during the negotiations of 
the Space Treaty and ever since to attribute to the word "peaceful" in it the 
novel meaning of "non~aggressive" can be of any avail. The reason is simple. 
The United States having accepted the wording of Article IV (2) as it stands, 
must accept what it actually provides, whatever its own mental reservations. 
Notwithstanding some doctrinal support of the United States' position,50 
one has only to consider the implications of the expression "peaceful" meaning 
"non~aggressive" and not "non~military." In the words of Professor Ivan Vlasic, 
"If 'peaceful' means 'non~aggressive,' then it follows logically-and absurdly-
that all nuclear and chemical weapons are also 'peaceful,' as long as they are 
not used for aggressive purposes."51 Further, if "non~aggressive" is truly the 
meaning of "peaceful," then does the specific provision in Article IV(2) that 
the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties "exclu~ 
sively for non~aggressive purposes" mean that elsewhere, especially in outer 
void space, the contracting Parties are contrariwise not so restricted and may 
engage in activities which are partly or wholly for aggressive purposes? Would it 
be possible, for instance, to deliberately ram someone else's satellites in orbit, 
geostationary or otherwise, or fire on them? Since the Space Treaty cannot be 
interpreted to yield such absurd results, and since acts "for aggressive or aggres~ 
sion purposes" are under international law and the United Nations Charter, es~ 
pecially Article 2(4), permitted nowhere in the universe, the specific provision 
as found in the first sentence of Article IV (2) must consequently mean some~ 
thing different: it must mean that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be 
used exclusively for non~military purposes. Otherwise, there would be no point 
in having that first sentence. "Peaceful" in that first sentence means "non~mili~ 
tary," whatever mental reservation the most powerful contracting Party to the 
Treaty might have had on the subject. 
3. Subsequent Practice. However, Professor Vlasic, in reliance on Article 31 (3) 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of T reaties52 on interpretation 
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based on the parties' subsequent practice, and the International Court of 
Justice's North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969)53 regarding the role of the 
States "specially affected" in the formation of rules of general international law, 
seemed to have conceded that the United States usage of the word "peaceful" 
may now be its accepted meaning. He cited the enormous amount of military 
activities of both the United States and the Soviet Union in outer space, and 
remarked: "No State has ever fonnally protested the U.S. interpretation of the 
phrase 'peaceful uses' in the context of outer space activities."54 
With respect, such a conclusion is unwarranted. Article 31 (3 ) (b) of the Vi, 
enna Convention, which is itself based on the International Court ofJustice's 
Temple of Preah Vihear Case (1962) ,55 provides quite explicitly that interpreta, 
tion can take into account "any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation."56 
But here, it does not appear justified to mix what is expressly proVided for in 
Article 31 (3 ) (b) of the Vienna Convention with what was said in relation to 
the formation of general international law by the Court in the North Sea Conti, 
nental Shelf Cases concerning parties "specially affected." In any case, in the 
present instance, there cannot be said to have been any subsequent practice re, 
garding the interpretation of the phrase "exclusively for peaceful purposes" in 
Article IV(2) of the 1967 Space Treaty, and certainly no subsequent practice 
which "establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation." 
As regards the point that there has been no protest, it needs to be pointed 
out that all the military activities of the United States and the Soviet Union are 
actually in outer void space, not on celestial bodies. Insofar as the moon and 
other celestial bodies are concerned, there has been no known or even sus' 
pected exploration or use of the moon or other celestial bodies for military pur, 
poses. There has, therefore, so far been no reason why any contracting State 
which believes in "peaceful" meaning "non,military" and not "non,aggressive" 
should lodge a protest. As a result, one can definitely not speak of any subse, 
quent practice acquiescing in the United States' interpretation of the term 
"peaceful" based on the absence of any protest insofar as Article IV (2) is con, 
cerned, since States are certainly not required to monitor and correct other 
States' mistakes in their understanding of the law or legal malapropisms, as 
long as they do not put their misinterpretation into practice. 
Insofar as the outer void space is concerned, where Professor Vlasic said all 
kinds of military space activities were widely known to be taking place without 
protest, there would be even less reason to protest. There would be grounds for 
protest only if any contracting State were to orbit or station weapons of mass 
destruction in outer space. Up to now, it does not appear that any party to the 
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Space Treaty, or any State at all, has done so or tried to do so. Outer void space 
has not been reserved for exclusively peaceful purposes, or, as for that matter, 
for any specific purposes, and all the military activities cited by Professor Vlasic as 
taking place there are perfectly legal under the Space T reaty.57 Consequently, up 
to now, there has been neither reason nor ground for protest. One can, there-
fore, hardly base a case of subsequent practice in relation to the word "peace-
ful" in Article IV(2) on what has been going on in outer void space, to which 
the restriction to peaceful uses does not apply. 
On the question of either practice or subsequent practice, as both the T em-
pie of Preah Vihear Case58 and the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case59 show, a 
State's legal rights can be adversely affected by the conduct of others only if it 
can be proved to have accepted, or to have over a period of time failed to pro-
test when it had cause to protest against, a situation which actually impinged 
on its rights or interests. In our case, the fact that the contracting States to the 
Space Treaty have not protested the practice of one or two of them choosing to 
misuse the term peaceful to describe their perfectly lawful military activities in 
outer void space certainly cannot amount to what Article 31 (3 ) (b) of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties calls "agreement of the parties" re-
garding such a use of the term in relation to the treaty. Indeed, if every time 
some foreign State official commits a legal malapropism, one were required to 
protest, whether or not one's rights are affected, government offices would 
hardly have time to do anything else! 
4. Preparatory Work. As a matter of fact, nor can one invoke Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention, which allows the preparatory work of the Treaty to be 
used as a "supplementary means of interpretation," even though the United 
States negotiators of the Treaty appeared to have spent much effort in the cor-
ridors propagating the notion that "peaceful" meant "non-aggressive" and not 
"non-military." In the first place, this novel and bizarre use of a familiar word 
was never, as far as known, recorded officially as a reservation in any of the pre-
paratory work concerned with the Treaty itself, and still less is there any record 
of the other negotiators acquiescing in such an extraordinary interpretation. 
There has been only hearsay, which certainly does not count. It is true that 
treaties can use any term in any meaning they wish to assign to it. The Moon 
Treaty,60 for example, more or less proclaims in Article 1 that insofar as the 
treaty is concerned, when it says moon, it means all the celestial bodies within 
the solar system other than the earth. But there is no such provision in the 1967 
Space Treaty. With a use of the term as upside down as the United States is 
propagating, the only way that it can be acceptable without ambiguity would be 
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for this usage to be defined explicitly in the Treaty, as the Moon Treaty has 
done with the word "moon." If there was an equivalent provision in. the 1967 
Treaty, then there would be no problem, but there is no such provision. 
It is true that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention provides that resort can 
be made to the preparatory work of a treaty in interpretation, but the provision 
makes it clear that doing so is but a "supplementary means," one which may be 
used only; 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
There is nothing ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd or unreasonable in 
interpreting "peaceful" to mean "non,military," which is the ordinary and nor' 
mal meaning of the word. There is no need therefore to invoke preparatory 
work. On the contrary, to interpret "peaceful" as meaning "non,aggressive" is, 
to use the words of Article 32, "manifestly absurd and unreasonable." 
It is unreasonable because such an interpretation renders the first sentence 
of Article IV(2) of the Space Treaty totally useless. First, States under current 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations are already bound not 
to engage in aggressive activities, and parties to the Space Treaty have already 
pledged themselves in Article III to abide by international law and the UN 
Charter in their exploration and use of outer space. Consequently, under this 
interpretation, the first sentence would be redundant and only the second sen' 
tence of Article IV(2) would be relevant. Instead of being merely exempli, 
ficative, as it should be, if the first sentence is controlling, as in Article I of the 
Antarctic Treaty, the second sentence would be the only material provision in 
Article IV (2). Its enumeration of the contracting Parties' obligations would be 
exhaustive. Sentences three and four would also become totally redundant; for 
there would be nothing in the first sentence even remotely to suggest that either 
military personnel or military equipment might not be used for "non,aggressive" 
exploration or use. Such an interpretation would be totally unreasonable. 
But to interpret "peaceful" in Article IV (2) as "non,aggressive" would in 
fact be "manifestly absurd," for reasons already given by Professor Vlasic. In ad, 
dition, if this is the correct interpretation, since Article IV(2) applies only to 
celestial bodies and not the outer void space, the absence of such a stipulation 
in, say, Article IV(l) or anywhere else in the Treaty immediately gives rise to 
the argument, as we have said, that contrariwise aggressive activities are permis' 
sible in outer void space! Otherwise, why an express provision providing that 
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the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used exclusively for non, aggressive 
purposes? 
The provision of the Vienna Convention that is applicable in this case is, 
therefore, neither Article 31 (3) on subsequent practice, nor Article 32 on pre' 
paratory work, but Article 1 (1), which provides as follows: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.61 
In sum, the conclusion is inevitable that "peaceful" in the Space Treaty as a 
whole and in Article IV (2) in particular, means, has always meant and contin, 
ues to mean "non,military," and not "non,aggressive," notwithstanding United 
States attempts to maintain otherwise. 
Sentence Two of Article N(2). If, as we have just shown, "peaceful" in the first 
sentence of Article IV(2) means "non,military," then it becomes obvious that 
the second sentence of Article IV(2), as in Article I of the Antarctic Treaty, is 
purely exemplificative. No activity whatsoever of a military nature is permitted 
on the moon and the other celestial bodies. As for the fact that only celestial 
bodies, but not the moon, are mentioned in the second sentence-this cannot 
possibly have any significance, since throughout the Treaty the moon has aI, 
ways been treated as one of the celestial bodies. Besides, the first sentence hav, 
ing explicitly referred to the moon and other celestial bodies, it would have been 
purely repetitive, in the next sentence intended to give examples of what may 
not be done on all celestial bodies, to again add an express reference to the 
moon.62 
The Last Two Sentences of Article N(2). The same applies to the omission of 
any qualification before "equipment and facility" in the last sentence. The last 
two sentences, following the example of the Antarctic Treaty, set out two 
permitted, or seeming, exceptions to the principle laid down in the first 
sentence. They are both of a similar character. Provided that the research or 
exploration is for peaceful purposes, what might otherwise be thought prohibited 
is expressly allowed, namely military personnel and equipment or facility. The 
omission of the qualification "military" insofar as equipment and facility are 
concerned is purely elliptical. Furthermore, the fact that, apart from the mention 
of weapon testing being forbidden, which falls clearly under the heading of a 
military activity, every item in the second and third sentences of Article IV (2) is 
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qualified by the adjective "military," namely, "military bases, installations and 
fortifications," "military manceuvres," and "military personnel" also confirms that 
what is meant in the last sentence is "military equipment or facility." 
The existence of the last two sentences in Article IV(2) permitting the use 
of military personnel and equipment or facilities for respectively peaceful pur, 
poses and peaceful exploration63 shows clearly that Article IV(2) of the Space 
Treaty, like Article I of the Antarctic Treaty, must have felt that such explicit 
exemptions were necessary, and this could only be because there is a blanket 
prohibition of military uses in the first sentence. Otherwise, since the research 
and exploration need be only for "non, aggressive purposes" and not "non,mili, 
tary," it goes without saying that any personnel and equipment can be used. 
As to these last two sentences, the opinion is sometimes voiced that, since 
military personnel and equipment can be used, Article IV (2) cannot possibly 
intend to prohibit the use of celestial bodies for military purposes, and "peace, 
ful" must mean non,aggressive, or at least something in between.64 Such views 
ignore the precedent of the Antarctic Treaty, and what was so well explained 
by Edwin B. Parker, the umpire in the United States,German Mixed Claims 
Commission (1922) in Opinion Construing the Phrase "Naval and Military Works 
or Materials" as Applied to Hull Losses and Also Dealing with Requisitioned Dutch 
Ships (1924), which graphically shows that the test of whether an activity or 
equipment is of a military or non' military character can be an essentially func, 
tional one and not one of nominal status. He said in that case: 
The taxicabs privately owned and operated for profit in Paris during September, 
1914, were in no sense military materials, but when these same ta.'i:icabs were 
requisitioned by the Military Governor of Paris and used to transport French 
reserves to meet and repel the oncoming German army, they became military 
materials, and so remained until redelivered to their owners. The automobile 
belonging to the United States assigned to its President and constitutional 
commander,in-chief of its Army for use in Washington is in no sense military 
materials. But had the same automobile been transported to the battlefront in 
France or Belgium and used by the same President, it would have become a part 
of the military equipment of the Army and as such impressed with a military 
character.65 
Thus, in reverse, the fact that the first person in space was a Soviet military 
officer, and two of the three men who first flew to the moon were respectively a 
United States Air Force colonel and Air Force lieutenant colonel did not pre' 
clude their flights from being explorations of outer space for peaceful purposes. 
The essential criterion is the purpose of the activity. 
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This is not to deny that there are activities and uses which can serve both 
military and civilian purposes. From the standpoint of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security, this is a serious problem which causes much con-
cern,66 but insofar as the law is concerned, Article IV(2) is quite explicit. The 
moon and other celestial bodies may only be used by the contracting States to 
the Treaty "exclusively for peaceful purposes"; in other words, no admixture of 
any military purpose. From this point of view, the law can only look at the pres-
ent and actual purpose, whether overt or covert, but not speculative ulterior 
motives. 
After all, as we have seen before, the whole space programme has tremen-
dous military and strategical significance. To be realistic, the total demilitarisa-
tion of the moon and other celestial bodies is possible largely because they are, 
at least as things stand at the moment, militarily and strategically of no, or lit-
tle, significance. As far as one is aware, none of the space Powers is contemplat-
ing using the moon or any other celestial bodies for military purposes. This 
tenacity of holding on to a misleading interpretation of the word "peaceful" in 
relation to the Space Treaty is difficult to understand, especially since the ban-
ning of military activities in the Treaty does not apply to outer void space, as a 
careful examination of Article IV(!) will show. 
In any event, the last two sentences of Article IV (2) of the Space Treaty, far 
from modifying the ordinary meaning of the word "peaceful" in the article's first 
sentence, serve only to confirm that it means "non-military." 
The 1979 Moon Treaty.67 Insofar as the demilitarisation of the moon and the 
other celestial bodies is concerned, Article 3 of the Moon Treaty basically re-
peats Article IV of the Space Treaty, especially Article IV(2), except that the 
scope of the Moon Treaty is limited to the moon and only the celestial bodies 
within the solar system other than the earth, and, therefore, does not extend to 
celestial bodies outside the solar system. The specific mention of the moon in 
Article 3(4), which was omitted in the second sentence of Article IV(2) of the 
Space Treaty, for reasons which have been given above, in fact does not add 
anything of significance to the latter.68 Apart from the express prohibition of 
placing weapons of mass destruction in a "trajectory to" the moon, the only dif-
ference lies in the Moon Treaty's Article 3(2), which specifically prohibits the 
threat or use of force or other hostile act. Since Article 2 of the Moon Treaty al-
ready binds the contracting States to observe international law and the Charter 
of the United Nations, and since Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter al-
ready prohibits the threat or use of force, and no doubt also the la:unching of 
any weapon of mass destruction against any place in the universe without 
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lawful justification, the only real addition consists in the prohibition of "the 
threat or use of ... other hostile act." The nature of these hostile acts remains, how~ 
ever, unclear, unless they refer to acts of individuals to which in principle in~ 
ternational law is not applicable. But since, under both Article VI of the 
Space Treaty and Article 14(1) of the Moon Treaty, contracting States bear 
"international responsibility" for national activities in space carried on whether 
by themselves or by non~governmental entities, including individuals, and 
for assuring that they are carried out in conformity with the respective trea~ 
ties, both of which provide for compliance with international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations, they would already have the responsibility of 
ensuring that the acts of such individuals comply with the States' interna~ 
tional obligations.69 
Article IV(l) 
Article IV (1) of the Space Treaty provides: 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in 
outer space in any other manner. 
As we have seen, this provision in the Space Treaty is directly inspired by item 
3 of the Eisenhower Proposal, except for the omission of the condition of verifi~ 
cation. In addition, Article IV(l) also specifies that outer space includes celes~ 
tial bodies. 
In that connection, the omission of a specific mention of the moon, like the 
similar omission in the second sentence of Article IV (2), is again of no signifi~ 
cance.70 It will also readily be seen that Article IV (1) reproduces almost verba~ 
tim the relevant paragraph of General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of 17 
October 1963, when the long~winded formula of "outer space, including the 
moon and other celestial bodies" had not yet been developed, and as we have 
seen in the case of Resolution 1962 of the same year, the usage then was always 
to refer to "outer space and celestial bodies," without any specific mention of 
the moon. In any event, the moon is obviously a celestial body. 
Resolution 1884 was, of course, itself based on a mutual understanding be~ 
tween the Soviet Union and the United States. From this point of view, the 
1967 Treaty merely put into a multilateral treaty a mutual undertaking which 
the superpowers had reached between themselves, and to which the United 
Nations had already called on all States to subscribe. Consequently, it added 
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relatively little to the restriction on their freedom of action in outer space, 
especially that of the superpowers. All that Article IV(1) provides is that no 
"nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" may be 
stationed in any manner anywhere in outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies. 
In other words, insofar as the immense void space in between the innumera, 
ble celestial bodies (the outer void space) is concerned, apart from the limita, 
tion on the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, the 1967 Treaty as a 
whole, including its Article IV (1), leaves the contracting States entirely free to 
use outer void space in any way they wish, including using it for military pur, 
poses, particularly in self,defence in accordance with the rules of international 
law and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,71 subject only to applicable 
rules of general international law, the United Nations Charter, in particular its 
Article 2(4), and any other treaty obligations States may have. In brief, outer 
void space has NOT been reserved for use exclusively for peaceful (non,military) 
purposes, contrary to a very prevalent view.72 
From this point of view, Article 3(3) of the Moon Treaty adds nothing to 
Article IV (1) of the Space Treaty, which already prohibits not only the installa, 
tion of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction "on celestial 
bodies," but also stationing them "in outer space in any other manner." The 
Moon Treaty has remedied the omission of a specific reference to the "moon" 
in the second sentence of Article IV(1), but as we have already pointed out, 
this omission is of no significance.73 The only addition made by Article 3 (3) of 
the Moon Treaty, if addition it really be, is the prohibition of placing of any 
space object carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction in a "trajectory to or around the moon," again in the sense the word 
moon is used in the Moon Treaty. The essential condition of outer void space 
has not been affected. 
Thus, insofar as Article IV of the 1967 Space Treaty is concerned, as well as, 
for that matter, the Treaty itself and the 1979 Moon Treaty, the contracting 
States remain free to deploy IN OUTER VOID SPACE any type of military sat, 
ellite, including reconnaissancej communications, early warning, navigational, 
meteorological, geodetic and other satellitesj construct manned or unmanned 
military space stationsj carry out military exercises and manceuvreSj station or use 
any non,nuclear or non,mass destruction weapon there, including anti,satellite 
weapons (ASAT) and ballistic missile defence systems (BMD)j and last but not 
least, though this en~meration is by no means exhaustive, send through or into 
outer void space any weapon, whether or not nuclear74 or of mass destruction, 
against any target on earth or in outer space75-of course, always subject to 
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applicable rules of international law and specific treaty obligations, including 
the United Nations Charter, particularly Articles 2(4) and 51. 
With this immense freedom that the contracting States have in outer void 
space, it is hard to understand how, first, one can fail to see the difference be' 
tween Article IV(I) and Article IV(2) of the Space Treaty, and maintain that 
"peaceful" in Article IV(2) is intended to mean no more than "non,aggres, 
sive," and second, how one can possibly claim or think that the whole of outer 
space is limited to use for peaceful purposes only, without reducing the word 
"peaceful" to meaninglessness. 
The American arbitrator F. K. Nielsen, in his 1923 U.S.,Mexican General 
Claims Commission dissenting opinion in the International Fisheries Co. Case 
(1931), rightly pointed out: 
An inaccurate use of terminology may sometimes be of but little importance, and 
discussion of it may be merely a quibble. But accuracy of expression becomes 
important when it appears that inaccuracy is due to a confusion of thought in the 
understanding or application of proper rules or principles oflaw.16 
Irrespective of whether or not Article IV of the Space Treaty has now be, 
come a matter of general international law, there is no doubt that the 1967 
Space Treaty, as President Johnson said of it at the time, was "the most impor, 
tant arms control development since the limited test ban treaty of 1963."77 It is 
consequently extremely important that there should be a clear understanding 
of what it means. The world has cause to be deeply concerned about the mili, 
tary use of space. 78 However, arms limitation and control in space cannot be di, 
vorced from the much wider political problems and extremely complex 
relations that exist between nations. Yet to begin with, one must be clear as to 
what one has at the moment, namely, Article IV of the Space Treaty, which is 
the obvious starting point. For the rest, the three indispensable conditions of 
successful international lawmaking are: 1) perceived need; 2) propitious politi, 
cal climate; and 3) due representation and consequential support of the domi, 
nant section of international society, including what the International Court of 
Justice calls the States "specially affected."79 However, those who seek to se, 
cure the whole of outer space exclusively for peaceful exploration and use need 
first of all to ensure that the word "peaceful" is correctly interpreted. Othenvise, 
they could score an entirely empty victory and fall into the kind of meaningless 
self,deception typified by Article 88 of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conven, 




Summary and Conclusions 
1. The 1967 Space Treaty remains very close to the United States' policy on 
space first announced by President Eisenhower in 1960. 
2. The original United States intention as regards the celestial bodies was 
that there should be no "warlike" activities on them, which may not mean that 
they should be completely demilitarised. 
3. Popular opinion and a number of governments were clamouring for the 
whole of outer space, including all the celestial bodies, to be preserved for ex~ 
clusively peaceful, i.e., non~military, exploration and use. 
4. The two superpowers evidently did not wish to be seen as opposing this 
wish, while seeking ways of keeping all options open, in view of the obvious im~ 
portance of outer space for military purposes. The Soviets, well used to con~ 
cealing the true nature of practically everything they did, simply carried on 
with their practice of dissimulating all their military activities in space as 
non~military, and thus peaceful. The United States negotiators, instead, propa~ 
gated the novel idea that "peaceful" meant merely "non~aggressive" and not 
"non~military." Every effort was made not to disturb the popular illusion that 
everyone was using outer space, including the moon and the other celestial 
bodies, only for peaceful purposes. 
5. In the 1967 Space Treaty, the only article that concerns the military use 
of the whole of outer space is Article IV. Neither the Preamble nor Articles 
1(1), IX or XI of the Treaty affect the contracting States' freedom to use outer 
space for military purposes, though they all intend to promote its peaceful use. 
Although the Space Treaty makes much of international co~operation in the 
peaceful uses of outer space, there is no provision, contrary to a very prevalent 
misconception, anywhere in the entire Treaty which reserves the whole of 
outer space exclusively for peaceful use or exploration. 
6. Only the moon and the other celestial bodies have been so reserved in 
Article IV (2), which does not apply to the void in between-what I have called 
"the outer void space." The first sentence of Article IV (2), in providing that 
the "moon and other celestial bodies shall be used ... exclusively for peaceful 
purposes," has the effect of completely demilitarising all the celestial bodies. 
7. Notwithstanding the stance taken by the United States, the word "peace~ 
ful" in the Treaty as a whole, and in its Article IV(2) in particular, by all the 
rules of treaty interpretation, retains its ordinary and well~established meaning 
of "non~military." To argue that it means "non~aggressive" leads to illogical, 
unreasonable, and even absurd consequences. 
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8. It is unwarranted to conclude from the fact that the United States has 
persistently interpreted the word "peaceful" in Article IV (2) as meaning 
"non~aggressive" and not "non~military," and that there has been "no protest" 
from other States, that the United States interpretation has consequently 
been confirmed by subsequent practice in accordance with Article 31 (3) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The reason is simply that 
there has up to now not been any known occasion when the United States 
tried to implement its interpretation in regard to Article IV(2), by carrying on 
"non~aggressive" military activities on the moon or other celestial bodies. The 
result is that there has been no violation of Article IV (2) and, therefore, no 
need for any other State to protest. 
9. The fact that the United States has long qualified its military activities in 
outer void space as peaceful without evoking any protest proves even less, inas~ 
much as such activities are, insofar as the Treaty is concerned, governed by its 
Article IV(I) and lawful under it. There is no reason or ground for other con~ 
tracting States to protest simply because the United States wishes to give such 
activities a whimsical description. 
10. Nor can one invoke the history of the Treaty to justify the United States 
interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, inasmuch as not 
only has there been no express reservation on the part of the United States in 
this regard, but there has also been no recorded pronouncement on the part of 
the United States accompanying the presentation or adoption of this Article or of 
the Treaty to this effect that has been accepted by the other negotiating parties. 
11. The applicable provision of the Vienna Convention is Article 31 (1), 
which provides that the terms of a treaty are to be interpreted in good faith and 
given their "ordinary meaning." The ordinary meaning of "peaceful" is, of 
course, "non~military." 
12. The first sentence of Article IV (2) being categoric, the second sentence 
is purely exemplificative. 
13. The omission in the second sentence of Article IV (2) of a specific refer~ 
ence to the moon when dealing with celestial bodies is without Significance, in~ 
asmuch as the previous sentence has already mentioned "the moon and other 
celestial bodies," thus clearly indicating that the moon is one of the celestial 
bodies. The omission is purely elliptical. 
14. Similarly, the omission of any qualification as to the nature of the equip~ 
ment and facility in the last sentence of Article IV (2) must be understood to 
mean military equipment and facility, in view of the reference to military per~ 
sonnel in the previous sentence. Such ellipses are perfectly normal. 
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15. The express authorisation of the use of military personnel, equipment 
and facilities for peaceful purposes, far from showing that the word "peaceful" 
in the first sentence does not mean "non~military," on the contrary conclu~ 
sively demonstrates that it does mean "non~military," for sentences three and 
four in Article IV (2) constitute clear and express exemptions from the prohibi~ 
tion laid down in the first sentence. Otherwise, they would not be thought to be 
necessary, even if only out of an abundance of caution, since the exemptions 
are perfectly compatible with the spirit of the first sentence. 
16. Article 3 of the Moon Treaty basically repeats Article IV of the Space 
Treaty insofar as the latter concerns the moon in the sense the word is used in 
the Moon Treaty, namely the moon and all the celestial bodies within the solar 
system other than the earth. 
17. Insofar as the whole of outer void space in between the celestial bodies 
is concerned, the only provision in the Space Treaty concerning military use is 
to be found in its Article IV(l), in which the contracting States "undertake not 
to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, ... or station such weapons in outer 
space in any other manner." It follows that, subject to the observance of appli~ 
cable rules of international law and of the United Nations Charter, as well as 
relevant treaty obligations, contracting States may otherwise use outer void 
space for military purposes in any manner they wish, particularly in legitimate 
self~defence in accordance with the applicable rules of international law. Arti~ 
cle IV (1) has definitely not excluded all military uses of outer void space. 
18. In sum, the 1967 Space Treaty has by no means reserved the whole of 
outer space for exclusively peaceful exploration or use. Its Article IV(l) merely 
prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in the whole of outer 
space, a measure which the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to 
between them even before the Treaty. Whether "peaceful" means "non~mili~ 
tary" or "non~aggressive" consequently has no effect whatsoever on the con~ 
tracting States' freedom to use the outer void space for military purposes in 
accordance with international law . Only Article IV (2) of the Treaty has com~ 
pletely demilitarised celestial bodies by saying that they shall be used solely for 
peaceful purposes. The legal position of the military use of outer space under 
the Space Treaty is summed up in Figure 4. 
It results that only if the United States intends to use any of the celestial 
bodies for military purposes does it make sense to distort the meaning of 
"peaceful" from "non~military" to "non~aggressive." Since it is not believed 
that the United States has any such intention, and since the world has now be~ 
come far more realistic regarding the use of outer space, the United States' 
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deliberate and continuing misinterpretation of "peaceful" in the Space Treaty 
to mean "non-aggressive" and not "non-military" appears to be wholly without 
purpose and behind the times, while gratuitously ruining a most useful and de-
sirable word, and at the same time opening the door to possible mischief. It 
should be dropped forthwith. 
Figure 4: The Military Use of Outer Space 





1. International law and UN Charter 
applicable (Article III), which prohibit 
aggression and the use or threat of 
force (Charter, Article 2(4)); 
2. No stationing of "nuclear weapons 
or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction" anywhere in outer space 
in any manner (Article IV(1)). 
19. The world's fervent hope is not only that Article IV of the Space Treaty 
has by now acquired a sufficient opinio generalis juris generalis to qualify as a rule 
of general international law, 81 but also that States would, especially in the wake 
of the official celebration in 1997 of the end of the Cold War,82 make rapid 
progress not merely in further limiting the military use of outer void space, but 
also in using outer space for the purpose of assisting limitations of armament or 
even general disarmament everywhere by providing an effective means of veri-
fication. In order to do so, one has first to be clear as to the meaning and scope 
of Article IV of the Space Treaty, which is the obvious starting point, and the 
precise meaning of the word "peaceful." There is definitely the need to ensure 
that real Peace prevails on earth, as well as in space. The political climate is 
propitious. All that is needed to satisfy the three indispensable conditions for 
successful international lawmaking to achieve this end is the political will of 
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